The recent nancial crisis has lead the IASB to settle new reporting standards for nancial instruments. The extended ability to measure some debt instruments at amortized cost is associated with a new impairment losses mechanism: Expected Credit Losses. In this paper, after a brief description of the principles elaborated by IASB for IFRS 9, we propose a methodology using CDS market prices in order to monitor signicant changes in creditworthiness of nancial instruments and subsequent credit losses impairment. This methodology is implemented in detail to a real world dataset. Numerical tests are drawn to assess the eectiveness of the procedure.
Introduction
The nancial crisis put a spotlight on the need to strengthen, among others, accounting recognition of credit loss provisions. It highlighted the need of incorporating a broader range of credit information than the current practice under IAS 39 and IFRS statements would suggest, see Barth and Landsman (2010) . Recently, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) together with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) also highlighted the need to recognize credit losses related to loans commitments and nancial guarantee contracts. In an exposure draft, hereafter referred to as the ED, released by the IASB (2013), practitioners are invited to incorporate credit losses before they have been incurred. This is motivated by the fact that the delayed recognition of credit losses was identied by the Financial Crisis Advisory Group (FCAG), among others, as a weakness in existing accounting standards during nancial crisis.
The current practice in the IAS 39 uses incurred losses that arise from past events and current conditions. Thus, future credit loss events are not considered, even when they are expected. As mentioned, this approach is subject to much criticism due to the signicant divergence that occurs in practical applications, which harden the task for stakeholders and users of nancial statements to make comparison among entities, see Magnan and Markarian (2011) .
The ED set out some proposals being based on a so-called three-stage model for impairment of provisions related to credit risk deterioration, which provides information about changes in the credit quality of nancial instruments. This three-stage procedure requires an entity to rstly distinguish between nancial instruments that have not deteriorated signicantly in credit quality since initial recognition or that have low credit risk at the reporting date. In this case, 12-month expected credit losses (ECL) are recognized. Secondly, there are nancial instruments that have deteriorated signicantly in credit quality since initial recognition (unless they have low credit risk at the reporting date) for these items, lifetime expected credit losses are recognized. Finally, when the credit quality of a nancial asset deteriorates to the point that credit losses are incurred or the asset is credit-impaired. Interest revenue is then calculated based on the net amortized cost carrying amount. When the recognition of expected credit losses is unchanged, lifetime expected credit losses are still recognized. Based on this new accounting standards one should be able to early detect any deterioration of the borrower's creditworthiness. It thus seems important for bonds holders to assess the credit quality during up to maturity in order to ll the ED's proposals. To this end a monitoring strategy is needed and one can rely the current market conditions in order to track the credit quality of bonds. In this case, one needs a representative quantity that assesses the credit quality during the period of interest. Therefore, we build an indicator assessing quantitatively the credit quality evolution allowing the monitoring of any deterioration and sounding an alarm once the latter is detected. More formally, we construct default probabilities based on the market conditions. These market-implied default probabilities will determine the credit risk inherent in all securities depending on the same borrower.
As the ED does not propose a precise denition of default (see BC97 in IASB (2013)) we rely on the celebrating approach proposed in Lando (1998) . So-called reduced-form models of default provide a natural setting for establishing a robust proxy for credit risk through the intensity of default. This approach is used to derive prices of most liquid product in the credit derivatives market, see Section 3. We then use the closed form formula based on an adequate specication of the intensity dynamics to recover the intensity of default from market quotes, which will be used later to monitor the creditworthiness of corresponding company.
The remainder is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the principles introduced in the IASB's ED regarding the impairment of nancial instruments. We present the main challenges and key issues when it comes to recognise signicant credit risk deterioration. We also discuss the use of market information to recognise creditworthiness. In Section 3, we recall nancial concepts related credit risk and discuss the representative credit information embedded in each product. Hence, we explain how default intensities used as a proxy of credit deterioration can be recovered from market quotations. Next, we use these quantities as to assess and monitor the creditworthiness. The latter is handled using a detection procedure introduced in Subsection 3.3. Finally, in Section 4, we carry out empirical analysis on realworld data.
Credit Losses Impairment
The aim of this section is to present the principles for recognizing credit losses impairment such as proposed in the march 2013 IASB's ED.
2.1 Principles. The present standard IAS 39 stated that an impairment loss is recognised only when it has been incurred. More precisely 58 states that an entity shall assess at the end of each reporting period whether there is any objective evidence that a nancial asset or group of nancial assets is impaired. If some quantitative principles have been given in order to deal with equity securities objective evidence of depreciation (the signicant and prolonged criteria studied in Azzaz et al. (2014) ), no such criteria stands for considering a debt instrument. Also this model has been called incurred loss model since no impairment losses are recognized in the nancial statements until there is an objective evidence of depreciation. In other words, only incurred (or almost sure) losses are recognized for debt instruments. This mechanism has been misjudged by the FCAG which recommended to explore some more forward-looking alternatives. This is the topic of the march 2013 IASB's Exposure Draft.
The main ED's proposals consist in setting an expected credit loss model in order to overcome the weaknesses identied by the FCAG. This approach mainly consists in recognizing expected credit losses as a loss allowance. Three stages of credit deterioration are dened:
• Stage 1 : Financial instruments that have not deteriorated signicantly since initial recognition or that have a low credit risk at the reporting date.
• Stage 2 : Financial instruments that have deteriorated signicantly since initial recognition (unless they have a low credit risk at the reporting date) but do not have objective evidence of a credit loss event.
• Stage 3 : Financial instruments have objective evidence of impairment at the reporting date.
At initial recognition, a nancial debt instrument is supposed to be in stage 1 (unless for purchased or originated credit-impaired nancial assets). At each reporting date, the entity holding such an instrument will have to assess whether credit risk has increased signicantly since initial recognition (case 2) and if there is any objective evidence of impairment (case 3) in order to maintain it at stage 1 or downgrade it at stage 2 (case 2) or 3 (case 3). Considerations about assessment of credit risk signicant increasing are given in Subsection 2.3.
The level of loss allowance has to be determined in reference with the stage in which the nancial instrument stands. When the credit risk on that nancial instrument has not increased signicantly since initial recognition, an entity shall measure the expected credit losses for that nancial instrument at an amount equal to the 12-month expected credit losses. Otherwise this measurement shall be equal to the lifetime expected credit losses. In terms of nancial reporting, the entity shall recognise in prot or loss the amount of expected credit losses (or reversal) that is required to adjust the loss allowance or provision to the balance-sheet (at the reporting date) that is required with this standard. These rules can be resumed as in • interest revenue (eective interest rate applied to the gross carrying amount); and
• gains of losses resulting from changes in ECL.
As an exception, when there is objective evidence of impairment resulting form events that occured after the initial recognition or if the asset was already credit-impaired at initial recognition (i.e. for stage-3 assets), interest revenue has to be calculated using the eective interest method on the net (of loss allowance) carrying amount.
Beyond the nancial statements, the ED proposed disclosures in order to identify and explain the amounts of ECL that arises in the nancial statements, the eect of changes in credit risk. These disclosures mainly consist in :
• reconciliation of gross carrying amounts and allowance balances;
• disclosures on credit risk grading;
• disclosures on techniques, assumptions and policies underlying the assessment of credit risk.
2.3 Assessment of Signicant Increases in Credit Risk. To assess credit risk, the entity should consider the likelihood of not collecting some or all of the contractual cash-ows over the remaining maturity of the nancial instrument, i.e. to assess the evolution of the probability of default (and not of the loss-given default for example). The ED did not impose a particular method for this assessment but it included the two following operational simplications:
• For nancial instruments with 'low-credit risk' at the reporting date, the entity should continue to recognize 12-month ECL;
• there is a rebuttable presumption of signicant increase in credit risk when contractual payments are more than 30 days past due.
In practice, most credit risk watchers rely on ratings released by major agencies, e.g. Moody's, Standard & Poors and Fitch among others. These ratings evaluate the creditworthiness of institutional and governmental debtors and assign a grade class for each depending on their default likelihood. Dierent tranches of creditworthiness are available ranging from Aaa to Baa3 for investment grades and Ba1 to C for speculative grades 1 . For each entity the rating may evolve over time when relative fundamental creditworthiness changes.
Thus, credit ratings could be valuable source of information for investors assessing the riskiness of their loans exposures. However, it turns out that credit rating agencies base their ratings on backward-looking accounting information which may not be useful to for impairing credit losses, especially when it comes to predict future losses. Indeed, the ED advocates the use of information that is more forward-looking than past-due information, see 9. Moreover, aside the accuracy of the ratings the lack of timeliness was the most criticized and highly visible rating property, see Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) and Bolton et al. (2012) . For example, rating agencies have repeatedly not only received critics for downgrading too slowly, Morgenson (2008) , but also for being unable to predict some high-prole bankruptcies Buchanan (2009) . This together with the recommendation of the ED makes the ratings less valuable for determining credit quality deterioration. The latter encourages to consider changes in market indicators of credit risk which include, but are not limited to: the credit spread, the credit default swap prices for the borrower and other market information related to the borrower, such as changes in the price of a borrower's debt and equity instruments, see B20.
Therefore, it is of high relevance to develop market-based measures of default to give a point-in-time indication of creditworthiness of an entity of interest. In the following, we search to assess credit risk (and its eventual increasing since the acquisition date) using market information delivered by the price of credit derivatives.
2.4 An Illustrative Example. In order to motivate the proposed approach, let us rst start with an example that accompanies the ED, see IE2. This is a hypothetical situation which illustrates the use of some credit proxies in order to ease the judgement for depreciation. To this end, let us consider an entity that originated a loan of 1,000,000. This entity using the most relevant information available, estimates that the loan has a 12-month default probability of 0.5% and the estimated amount of loss when the default occurs is 25%. In this case, the entity decided that the loan has a low credit loss since the initial recognition and thus recognise the 12-month ECL, being equal to 1,250 2 . In the following reporting date, suppose the default probability increased to 20% given the most relevant information available. In this case the lifetime ECL recognition applies. The main dierence between the two reporting periods relies on the dierence between the default probabilities.
Therefore, some natural questions arise: At which level of default probability the lifetime ECL should be recognised and vice versa? But above all, how can we choose a good estimate of the default probability? The following proposes a methodology to answer these questions.
Credit Risk Monitoring
The aim of this section is to give an overview of credit-sensitive products which we will use in order to assess credit risk of an individual debt nancial asset issuer.
3.1 Credit Risk in Bond and CDS Market. In the nancial market, there are various contracts in which credit risk is a signicant factor. Some particular instrument aim at providing investors with exible tools to create synthetic credit risk exposure tailored to their needs. The most popular credit derivative is a credit default swap (CDS). On the other hand, there are instrument that are not directly linked to credit risk but remains very sensitive to the latter. Among others, a corporate bond is an appealing example. Like all investments, corporate bonds carry risks. These include the risk that the issuing company fail to make timely payments of interest or principal. In that case, company will default on its bonds, which makes the creditworthiness of the issuer an important factor contributing to her bond premia. In the credit derivatives universe, the CDS are the most liquid contracts accounting for nearly half the total transactions' notional worldwide.
Although the IASB draft highlights the use of market indicators of credit risk for a particular nancial instrument (B20), measuring credit from the market price of corporate bonds, for example, is not an easy task. There are some debates currently about how much information, if it exists, one would extract from quoted prices of bonds and to which extent we can rely on this information to establish a robust proxy for assessing credit risk. Meanwhile, it is shown that yield spreads are far wider than is justied by historical default losses. Several explanations for this phenomena have been explored, such as tax eects, market risk and liquidity premia, see Feldhütter and Lando (2008) among others. On the other hand, an analysis of the factors aecting the CDS provides an understanding on why the latter reacts more strongly than bond spreads to deteriorations of the credit quality of the issuer. Indeed, as they are widely and deeply traded, CDS do reect market information about the credit risk of underlying nancial obligations. Also, various studies have shown that CDS markets generally reect valuable information and thus should convey credit quality about counterparties. Acharya and Johnson (2007) nd that the CDS markets is transmitting non-public information into publicly traded securities such as stocks. They showed that the information ow is concentrated on periods days with negative credit news, and for entities that experience or are more likely to experience adverse credit events. Similar ndings are supported in Norden and Weber (2004) showing that CDS markets anticipate rating downgrades and reviews for downgrade by three major credit rating agencies. In the same line, recent evidence that CDSs are potentially useful for regulatory purposes and private investors are presented in Flannery et al. (2010) . In Blanco et al. (2005) , the CDS spread has been considered as an upper bound on the price of credit risk. The authors show that the CDS prices lead in price discovery process making them a useful indicator to measure credit risk. However, the ED also suggests using some economic information which may reect the conditions that are likely to cause signicant change in the borrower's ability to its debt obligation (B20(f)). Although the latter may be of a great interest we choose to only focus on the CDS spreads and do not encompass any economic information. This is motivated by Greatrex (2009) showing that the CDS spreads reect credit conditions better than either macroeconomic interest rates or other economic or aggregate equity returns.
Therefore, it is straightforward to extract credit specic information on market expectations of default from the CDS quotes. This will be in line with the scope of our analysis as we aim at isolating the credit component.
3.2 Credit Default Swap. A credit default swap contract (CDS for short) is an agreement between two parties, called the protection buyer and the protection seller, to transfer to the seller the nancial loss that the protection buyer would suer if a particular credit event happened to a third party, called the reference entity. Formally, the protection buyer pays a xed fee or premium to the seller (xed leg) for a period of time (the maturity of the CDS) and if certain pre-specied credit event occurs, the protection seller pays a compensation to the protection buyer (oating leg). A credit event can be a bankruptcy of the reference entity, or a default of a bond or other debt issued by this reference entity. It also refers to any restructuring, obligation acceleration and payment failure of the reference entity (see Ch. VII in Brigo and Mercurio (2006) ). Moreover, as the ED has not precisely dened the credit event leading a recognition of the credit deterioration, the events triggering the CDS oating leg ll into the broader denition of a default event. Therefore, judgements on specic events to account for are necessary in this particular credit sensitive instrument.
In the precise denition of a CDS contract, there are given collection of settlement dates,
and a starting time T 0 < T 1 . Here, T 0 < T n = T is the maturity of contract. The year fraction between any two consecutive dates is denoted α j = T j −T j−1 and is in general constant and equal to three months. The xed leg payment at each period T j is denoted S 0 . This is a constant quarterly rate paid until default or maturity, whichever is rst. Thus, letting τ be the random time of the default event, the present value of the CDS xed leg, denoted
where B(t, T ) is the price at time t of a default-free zero-coupon bond maturing at T , i.e.
B(t, T ) = exp − T t
r s ds and r s is the risk-free interest rate. Similarly, the present value of the oating leg FLL(T 0 , [T], T, L), that is the payment of the protection seller contingent upon default, equals
where L GD is the loss given default being the fraction of loss over the all exposure upon the occurrence of a credit event of the reference company.
We denote by CDS(T 0 , [T], T, S t , L GD ) the price at time T 0 of the above CDS. The pricing mechanism for this product relies on the risk-neutral probability measure Q, the assumptions on interest-rate dynamics and the default time τ . Accordingly, the price is given as follows
where E denotes the risk neutral expectation (under probability measure Q) 3 . For a given maturity, the market quote convention consists in the rate S 0 being set so that the xed and oating legs match at inception. Precisely, the price of the CDS is obtained as the fair rate S t such that
whcih yields to the following formulation of the premium
Note that the two expectations in the above equation can be expressed using the risk-neutral probability Q as follows:
In what follows we characterize these probabilities using the well-known reduced form framework.
3.2.1 Cox Model. In the reduced-form framework, the default time τ is modelled as the jump of a Cox process with a given intensity λ = (λ t ) t≥0 , see Lando (1998) . A way of representing τ given the intensity λ is to set τ = Λ −1 ξ , where Λ is the stochastic hazard function dened as the time-integral of the intensity from 0 to t, i.e. Λ t = t 0 λ s ds. Here, ξ is a standard uniform random variable. With this in mind and assuming a deterministic intensity λ we have
This amounts to modelling τ as the rst jump time of a Poisson process with intensity λ. In view of our purpose, we further assume that the intensity λ is constant over maturities. This is to translate the market stakeholders credit risk appreciation remains stable. This assumes a xed creditworthiness during the lifetime of the entity's specic CDS at time T 0 .
In order to fully characterize the CDS spread, we should substitute the probability of the default event in Equation 3.3. Under the constant intensity, this probability is simply computed by noticing that exp(−Λ s ) = exp(λs), which yield the following closed form formula for S 0
It should be mentioned that the constant intensity assumption would not be suited to best t the CDS prices. Nevertheless, the objective of our analysis which aims at extracting the instantaneous information from the market should not be disturbed by such an assumption.
In what follows, we introduce the mechanism of market quotation for CDS contracts. Hence, we describe a methodology to extract the default intensities implied by the market from CDS premia.
3.2.2 Market-Implied Default Intensities. The formulation in Subsection 3.2 is known as the postponed CDS contract which well suited to derive market models of CDS rates, see Brigo and Mercurio (2006) . This implicitly assumes that is moved to T j when it arrives in the interval [T j−1 , T j ] and thus the payments in case of default events, i.e. L GD , are postponed and made at the end of each period T j . Similarly the spread is paid until T j . This will not aect our analysis as we are focusing on the credit events timing but on the market perception of the latter. Back to the CDS market rates, those are quoted, in practice, at a xed set of maturities, e.g. T ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, 10} in a year basis, and the typical year fraction between any two dierent settlement dates is constant, T j − T j−1 = α and is equal to three months. Consider a CDS with maturity T then at each date t the market quotes the CDS spread starting at T 0 = t, denoted S t , with maturity T + t. Observations are available for each so we are able to extract the implied intensity at time t, i.e. λ t .
3.2.3 Recovering Market Intensities. As mentioned, it is possible to strip default intensities from CDS quotes. To this end, we will need the bond prices B(t, t + T j ) for each maturity t + T j . The only remaining quantities in Equation 3.4 is the loss given default L GD and the intensity λ. Following common practice, we consider a constant L GD which would correspond, for example, to the mean recovery rate computed in the market for a rate-equivalent CDS contracts. Aside from being in line with existing credit risk management assumptions, the constant L GD is not recognized as proxy for assessing the lifetime expected losses, see 53. Moreover, assuming a constant L GD will ease the estimation the default intensities, which may not require the full require the full estimation of the expected credit losses. Finally, it only suces to equate the closed form formula in Equation 3.4 to the CDS quotes.
3.3 Monitoring Credit Risk. Let us now introduce the monitoring scheme that aims at detecting some specic change in the default intensities.
3.3.1 Quickest Detection Problem. We assume that the time varying intensity λ t obeys to the following dynamics
where, t is a a zero-mean homoscedastic white noise and µ and σ are some constant parameters. The trend µ is assumed to be deterministic and known. With credit quality deterioration in mind, the intensity λ t (in logarithmic scale) may change its drift µ in the future at an unknown time θ referred to, henceforth, as a change-point. We assume that the change-point θ is fully inaccessible knowing the pattern of λ t . It can be either ∞ (in case of absence of change) or any value in the positive integers. After the occurrence time θ the λ t 's evolve as follows:
where µ is the new drift, which is assumed to be deterministic and known.
As the credit quality of the rm changes over time, this model describes the migration between two rating classes. As such, a straightforward interpretation of the latter relies on the expected stability of the mean intensity between two credit events. We can implicitly assume that the pre-change drift µ should correspond to the average (implied) intensityin logarithmic scale -for a given credit grade class. Hence, µ is the average intensity when the entity undergoes a rating change and thus corresponds to the next rating class implied intensity. The error part σ t captures the uctuation of the credit quality.
The task is to locate the change-point θ as early as possible, while keeping the rate of false alarm under a given level. In the quickest detection framework, the solution this problem can be seen as the result of optimizing the tradeo between two performance criteria. First, there is the detection delay, which is the time between the occurrence and the detection time. This measures the ability of the detection scheme to sound an alarm after a change actually happens. Secondly, there is the rate of a false alarm, which is related to the detection accuracy. As a set of detection strategies, we consider the set of all stopping times t c d with respect to the information generated up to time t. The quickest detection objective imposes that t c d must be as close as possible to θ. Meanwhile, we balance the latter with a desire to minimize false alarms, see Lorden (1971) . For this detection strategy, it is shown that the cumulative sums (cusum for short) is optimal. More formally, if one x a given false alarm to π, which stands for the time until a false alarm (when the change never occurs), the stopping time t c d = inf{t ≥ 0; V t ≥ m} is optimal for triggering an alarm. Here, V t is the process given by
where x → L(x) is the likelihood ratio function. In view of our model in Equations (3.5)-(3.6) the likelihood function L(x) is the one linking the two marginals Q 0 = N (µ, σ) and N (µ, σ) , which is given as follows
It is worth looking more closely at the behaviour of the process V . First, note that the log-likelihood process L works as a measure of the adequacy of the observation with the underlying model in Equation 3.5. The process V can be interpreted as a sequential cumulative log-likelihood. The latter is equal to 0 when the incoming information of the log-intensity does not suggest any deviation from the model in (3.5). When V becomes greater than 0, we can interpret this as a deviation from the model in (3.5). This means that the 'real' model stands in between (3.5) and (3.6). In order to declare that the intensity is evolving with respect to the model in (3.6) we need a constraint in order to characterize the barrier m. This is typically achieved by imposing that the optimal time to raise a false alarm when no change occurs should be postponed as long as possible. We deliberately omit the technical details on such a procedure which stand beyond the scope of this paper. However, further insights on the quickest detection problem can be found in Basseville and Nikiforov (1993) and the reference therein.
3.3.2 Alarm System for Credit Impairment. To adapt the above methodology to our study, we follow broadly the considerations of the ED. In 4-5, it suggests that an entity shall compare the creditworthiness of a nancial instrument at the reporting date taking into consideration its initial credit risk (BC67-BC75). This requires an entity to recognize at the reporting date a signicant increase in credit risk based on an increase in the default intensity of the issuer or the borrower (B12). The ED has not dened how signicant should be the increase when assessing the change in credit risk nor specied the amount of change in probability of a default that would require the recognition of a creditworthiness deterioration. As to ease the application, the ED proposes that nancial instruments with low credit risk at the reporting date would not meet the lifetime expected credit losses criterion. For example, a nancial asset rated 'investment grade' at the reporting date is regarded as not having suered signicant credit deterioration and will remain as such until it is downgraded to below investment grade. To draw a connection with the monitoring procedure in the above subsection, let us consider an instrument with a rating above Baa in Moody's credit ratings which corresponds to an investment grade. In Table 2 , we show estimates of the average seven-year risk-neutral and real-world (actual) default intensities (DI) per annum for dierent credit ratings, see Hull et al. (2005) . The real-world DI are estimated from statistics on average cumulative default rates published by Moody's between 1970 and 2003. The implied DI are estimated from market prices of the CDS in the US market. In order to establish the monitoring scheme, we shall need various inputs. First, the average DI µ should be specied and must match the market DI of the instrument since initial recognition or the last reporting Finally, we should specify an average rate of false alarms, which species the frequency of sounding an alarm when nothing happens. A good candidate must reect the aversion of the credit risk quality observe of a false alarm. A part being as large as possible no further requirement are needed. For example, one could set the latter to 100 years. This means that a false alarm would go o once each hundred years of observations. This being set, we then recover the threshold level m by resolving the following equation (see Poor and Hadjiliadis (2009) 
where σ is estimated based on the historical observations.
Empirical Analysis
We apply the alarm sounding procedure to AIG, which witnessed a critical period of successive downgrades during the nancial crisis of 2007-2008. We go through details for this particular example and explain how one can apply the procedure.
4.1 Data. The CDS data in this section consist of bid and ask quotations for 1-year, 5-year
and 10-year CDS on AIG credit risk during the period from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2010. It goes without recalling that quotations are obtained on days when there is some level of participation in the market. Following common practices we use the midpoint of bid and ask quotations as a point estimate of CDS premium, see Longsta et al. (2005) .
4.1.1 Spreads and Credit Events. Figure 1 plots the daily CDS spreads for the three maturities over the considered period. When looking more closely at these spreads, we notice that they exhibit similar behaviour. More precisely, we can distinguish two periods fundamentally dierent from each other. Indeed, over the rst half of our sample (roughly from early 2005 to early 2007, see the zoomed period in Figure 1 ), CDS spreads declined reecting a period of calm. Then, beginning in March 2007, spreads increased and became more volatile, which corresponds to important early events in the nancial crisis, which we will discuss later on. Despite this negative information, the AIG rating remained unchanged at Aa2 level until the US government announced in, September 16 th 2008, it would make an emergency in an attempt to rescue AIG. Not surprisingly, the CDS spreads increased signicantly before the downgrade announcement. They rose to more than 250 basis points in mid-March 2008 and then fell to below 100 basis points in mid-May. From that point forward, its spread steadily increased. Two weeks before the government rescue, its spread was 375 basis points. Over the next two weeks, the spread increased dramatically, exceeding 2500 basis points on the day of the announced rescue.
Based on these facts we will build our detection procedure on two distinct periods. We thus divide the sample into two parts: The rst will run from January 2006 until the end of 2008 and the second is starting on 2009 until the end of the sample. As mentioned, the rst period is characterized by quiet calm credit risk events period followed by a near collapse of the underlying entity. During this period, various credit events have emerged in the market, which did not aect the rating of AIG. In the next period, although the spread has declined by the end of 2008 at around 500 basis points, it suddenly increased and was one more time above 2500 basis points in May 2009. It then declined thus until the end of our sample. These dierent periods are explored in details in the following when it comes to detecting the change of the credit quality. 4.1.2 Implied Intensities. Before proceeding to the estimation of the default intensity, we shall specify a discounting factor B(t, T ) covering both the observation dates t and the maturities T . To this end, we collect data from US treasury yield curve covering the desired period. The use of such a curve is line with the denition of the risk-free discount factor 4 . We use data for constant maturity {1/12; 3/12; 6/12; 1; 2; 3; 5; 7; 10} years from the Federal Reserve. Hence, we use a standard four-parameter model of Nelson (1987) to interpolate these par rates and obtain the value of the discount function at other maturities T j , needed to fully span the CDS settlement dates in Equation 3.4.
As mentioned before, the spreads S t only depends on the loss given default L GD , the intensity λ t and the discount factors B(t, T j ). The loss given default is assumed to be constant and (black) is xed at 40%, which is the rate commonly used in empirical studies as well as by major rating agencies. We then substitute the tted curve of B(t, T j ) for the CDS spreads in Equation 3.4. To derive the implied intensities for each observation date t we equate Equation 3.4 to the market quotes. Figure 2 depicts the implied default intensities in logarithmic scale for the AIG's CDS with maturities at 1-year, 5-year and 10-year. In this gure, we also show various credit events based on Moody's announcements. The vertical lines correspond to a 'Rating Action': The solid lines represent a 'Grade Review' and correspond to downgrades, the dashed lines show the announcement of a 'Negative Outlook' and the dotted are the 'Under Revision' of the grade 5 . The downgrades dates are collected in Table 3 form ve periods of stable rating. For example, during the period P1, the AIG rating was at Aa1 level.
In Figure 2 , we depicted the implied intensities in logarithmic scale, which ease the observation of the intensities evolution. We can distinguish similar behaviours as those already mentioned with regard to the spread evolution. We see in particular that the intensity has increased steadily since mid-2007 to reach a rst record level of about -1.185716 (in logarithmic scale). In other words, if we consider the intensity in September 15, 2008, just before the governmental rescue of AIG, the 1-year default probability of the latter is around 30%. In the previous period, i.e. P3, this probability was approximately at 5%, and in the period P2 it was averaging 0.46%. Looking more closely at the average default intensities for each period, we can remark that those are in adequacy with the calculations of Hull et al. (2005) . From Table 3 , we see that during the period P1, when AIG had a Aa1 rating, the average DI was at 0.79% and the calculation of this same DI over the US market was around 0.78% for the grade Aa. Another statistic of paramount importance is the D-test, reported in the third row of each panel in Table 3 . It provides information on the p-value of normality test of the intensity during each period. In other words, we test whether the model (3.5) is valid during the period: Larger the p-value, smaller the signicance meaning that the model (3.5) may not adequately explain the observation. We see that the p-value is signicant only during the period P1 (almost for each CDS). We thus may conclude that there has not been a change of the average DI during P1. During the period P4 ranging from September 15, 2008 to March 10, 2008 the p-values are relatively large, which may invoke a stable period in terms of the average DI. Apart from these two periods, however, the p-values are very small indicating that the model (3.5) is not valid and possible change in the trend of the intensity have occurred during these periods. This implicitly comforts our intuition that changes in the credit quality are not accounted by the rating agencies.
4.2 Alarm Sounding. The above preliminary analyses suggest that changes on the trend may have been occurred on the DI's dynamics. Here and subsequently, we focus on the detection procedure of these dierent changes over the sample and thereby being able to trigger an alarm to depreciate the asset of interest. Before proceeding, let us recall the main inputs of our approach:
• The historical DI average µ: It must match the average during the observation period. However, note that the calculation of the latter shall be made on a stable period. By stable we mean a period when the nancial instrument of interest has not experienced any major credit events. We must acknowledge that this is not an easy task because most of the periods in our sample are far from being stable (see the D-test results in Table 3 ). For this, we choose to consider the average intensity observed on the market for the same rating class. For example, if the monitoring procedure is carried out during the period P1, the average intensity µ is set to 0.78% (for the 5-year CDS), which is the average intensity for Aa level in the US market, see Table 2 . The same reasoning shall be applied to the other periods.
• The critical DI average µ: This quantity should reect the critical level of the average intensity beyond which the underlying entity falls into the speculative grade classes. A suitable candidate is the market average for rating class. According to Table 2 , average DI ranging beyond 5.07% corresponds to a rating of under Baa (speculative grade). To circumvent possible misestimation for the latter we x µ to 6.05%.
• The alarm threshold m: This level is derived as a solution of Equation 3.7. The only assumption is the false alarm level set equal to 100. Generally, the threshold level m is not as much sensitive to such an assumption.
This being put in place, we can now implement our detection procedure. For this, we need to construct the trajectory of our process V , given in formula 1. Nevertheless, to facilitate this step it is easily shown that the process V can also be built using the following simple recursive formula: This date corresponds to the origination of the nancial instrument. From then on, it is assumed that an observer follows the deterioration of the credit risk of AIG based on the above procedure. The rating of AIG during the preceding period (and even at the date of origination) was Aa1, see Table 3 . We thus consider µ = 0.78%, µ = 6.05% and the level triggering the alarm is equal to 10.81. We see that the process V exceeds this threshold in July 10, 2007, meaning that the level of credit risk of AIG has changed before this date (from the market point of view). The rating agencies have downgraded AIG by September 2008. Notice that before the alarm, the process V remains below the threshold and close to zero meaning that the initial model does correspond to the incoming observations. In order to understand this credit event alarm, we can refer to the major events during 2007 and particularly two important early events in the nancial crisis. First, various measures of subprime mortgage risk, including the ABX indices, CDS prices of the mortgage-backed securities, had begun to increase in early 2007. Second, New Century Financial, a prominent subprime mortgage broker, led for bankruptcy on April 2, 2007. Although the extent of AIG exposure to subprime mortgages was not yet known, the alarm could be associated with a market anticipation of its implication. It is also dicult to isolate any further information associated with this alarm from news articles and analyst reports during this period. However, we can implicitly deduce that this is could be related with the late announcement of a negative outlook of Moody's in February 12, 2008, followed by a downgrade to Aa3 level in May 2, 2008.
Besides being able to detect real breaks we will focus on the sensitivity of the detection procedure with respect to some settings: The maturity of the CDS and the granularity of data.
4.2.1 Spread Maturities. We look at the detection results according to the maturity of the CDS spread. Each CDS with a maturity of 1-year, 5-year or 10-year gives dierent intensity streams. These are shown in Figure 2 . Note that the behaviour of these intensities is substantially similar. Nevertheless, we can see that the default probability increases with the maturity of the underlying CDS. This is due to the fact that the entity is more likely to default in the long-term at least from the market participants point of view. This dierence, however, tends to shrink in times of crisis, see Table 3 . Table 4 shows the results for dierent Average 11/21/08 9/12/08 9/12/08 maturities for a monitoring procedure based on daily observations (rst row of each panel). The method used is that described previously, except that the input parameters are estimated on the historical data. In order to better compare the results we chose to x µ equal to the average DI over the period ranging from the origination (rst column) back to the last change of the rating. The critical value is set 1.4 × µ.
For an origination date lying in the calmer period in our sample (the rst two panels), we note that the procedure based on the CDS with 1-year and 10-year maturities sound an alarm in March-April 2006. On the other hand, the one based on the 5-year CDS triggers an alarm in July 2007. The rst two alarms are dicult to explain since the period concerned has experienced a decline in spreads and no information from the market can given any further explanation. We can see that even with an origination date in June 2006 the two alarms triggered in the same year, i.e. 2006. It must be said that the data's quality used is mostly responsible for this alarm. First, notice that in mid-2006 the 10-year intensities as so is the spreads jump in mid-2006, which may certainly trigger the alarm in absence of any change of regime. On the other hand, the 1-year CDS are much volatile and may bias the detection. Together with the 10-year CDS maturities, the 1-year CDS is less liquid and no much trades are available in the market. This has to impact on the stability of the latter and thus on the detection eectiveness. We must acknowledge that starting from the mid-2007 these contracts gains on attractivity, which is observable from the detection times. In fact, the dierence between the detection times for origination dates starting on early 2007 are smaller.
Finally, if we consider an origination date just before the near-collapse of AIG (August 2008), the 5-year CDS based intensities outperform on detecting the downgrade in September 2008. Overall, we should highlight that the latter is eective on detecting credit events much earlier than the rating agencies would downgrade. Table 4 , we show the detection times when using dierent data. First, we consider weekly data which are the CDS prices of each Wednesday of the week during our sample period. Next, we also average out the intensity over weeks and consider the resulting quantity.
Data Periodicity. In
We can see that this has practically no bearing on the performance of procedure based on 5-year maturity CDS. A discernible dierence relies on the detection times compared to daily observations especially for the 5-year CDS: The detection is delayed by some few days. Nevertheless, we observe that taking average or weekly data improves the detection of 1-year CDS in particular during the calm period of 2006. The detection is thus triggered in mid-2007. Finally, the new range of data failed to blur the imperfections observed in 2006. Averaged over a longer period could possibly remedy this.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we developed a monitoring procedure to address the recent principles of credit losses impairment introduced by the IASB. We proposed a credit risk indicator based on market quotes for some liquid CDS contracts. Thus, we extracted the implied intensity from this contracts and used it to detect changes on the underlying entity creditworthiness. The latter is shown to be a good proxy for anticipating credit events. It also lls into the standard requirement stated by the IASB's ED and has the merit to anticipate changes in credit ratings especially for downgrades.
The monitoring scheme is based on the assumption that the logarithm of the market implied intensity has to be stable in average between two credit events. Any change in the latter may invoke a change in the rating grade of the underlying entity. Thus assuming a critical level of average intensity beyond which the entity belong the speculative grade one may operate an on-line surveillance of the credit deterioration. It is based on the so-called cusum process which indicates somehow the adequacy of the model with the incoming observation from the market. The proposal is summarized in Figure 4 . Even if the method turns out to be ecient for detecting changes in credit risk, nonetheless the practical implementation can be a delicate matter. Especially, when it comes to track several nancial instruments, it would be appropriate to create an aggregate indicator of the creditworthiness of an entire class of instruments. Another possible choice of such an indicator is the so-called basket CDS, where a group of reference entities are specied in one contract. Also, we should stress out that this methodology could only serve as an alarm system and the eective impairment may rely on a closer investigation of nancial statements of each entity when the alarm is triggered. Moreover, examinations of nancial analyses and other non-quantitative information such as news articles and analyst reports can be very useful to explain the detected event.
As we have seen, the proposed method is mainly based on the availability of liquid CDS products allowing to extract the market appreciation of an entity credit risk. However, we must recognize that these are not generally available for each loan instrument especially for private equities and corporate debts from emerging markets. Nevertheless, most of insurance nancial instruments can be easily associated with a CDS contract since there are mainly issued from well referenced entities.
